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Dear editor,
Plenty of computing and storage resources in
the cloud are provided for users with restricted
computing and storage resources, which has at-
tracted the attention of many researchers [1, 2].
A generic blockchain-based cloud data auditing
scheme [3] is proposed, which is compatible with
any blockchains including the bitcoin blockchain.
In the data integrity checking scheme, certificate-
less signature (CLS) can be used to verify the iden-
tity of users. Besides, the key exchange is uti-
lized in the key generation [2], which can eliminate
the security channel to achieve system robustness.
Considering the real situation, the users who join
the cloud storage system may be revoked for some
reasons. Therefore after a user is revoked, it is
necessary to detect the validity of the tags of the
revoked user and update the tags on manner. The
group manager (GM) of scheme [4] updates the
key of the non-revoked user with the number of
revoked users. In addition, some improvements
have been proposed to support tag updates. Li
et al. [5] adopted an interactive method to update
the tags of the revoked user, which aims at reduc-
ing the computing overhead of the user. However,
there is a risk of signature forgery in their scheme
because the secret key and the signature message
are not bound in the signature process.
We put forward a certificateless public data in-
tegrity detection scheme that supports user revo-
cation in cloud storage. Our scheme enables the
key update of the group user and the tag update
of the revoked user. Besides, the user’s private key
used for signing is bound with the signature mes-
sage, which is secure against tag forgery attacks.
The idea of key exchange is exploited to enhance
the robustness of the system during the key gen-
eration process, which enables the GM to interact
with the user through public channels. In addi-
tion, according to the number of revoked users, the
GM updates the partial key for the non-revoked
user who then generates a new full key by utilizing
the updated partial key. Because the cloud service
provider (CSP) adopts the non-revoked user’s lat-
est public key and the number of revoked users
to inspect the identity of the user, it is ensured
that the revoked user without the latest key can-
not pass authentication. The proposed scheme can
resist chosen-message attacks.
Model. The system model mainly consists of
four entities: the group users, the GM, the CSP
and the third-party auditor (TPA). During the
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data integrity check, challenge information, which
is randomly generated by the TPA, is sent to
the CSP. The proof information of corresponding
blocks challenged, which is generated by the CSP,
is sent to the TPA. Finally, by using the parame-
ters of open log files and pseudo-random functions,
the TPA performs verification operations for the
validity of the proof. The CSP is semi-honest and
may cheat the TPA to think that the data stored
on the CSP has integrity and it undamaged for
additional benefits.
Our scheme. We specifically describe our
scheme, including eleven algorithms. We define
that each data block of a file is an element in Z∗q
and num is the number of users in a group.
• Setup. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative
cyclic groups of prime order q. There exists a bi-
linear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2. g is a generator
of G1. H1 : {0, 1}
IDl × G1 × G1 × {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q ,
H2 : G1 → Z
∗
q , H3 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1, H4 : Z
∗
q →
{0, 1}∗ and H5 : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → G1
are five secure hash functions. IDl is defined as
the bit length of user identity. f : Z∗q × Z
∗
q →
Z∗q is a pseudo-random function. The GM ran-
domly chooses s ∈ Z∗q and computes P = g
s.
Let s be the master secret key and P be the
corresponding public key. It keeps s private
and publishes the system parameters params =
(q, g,G1, G2, ê, P,H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, f).
• SecretValueGen. A user ui with the identity
IDi , 1 6 i 6 num, first selects xi ∈ Z
∗
q and com-
putes Xi = g
xi . Then ui sets uski = xi and
upki = Xi and sends upki to GM.
• PartialKeyGen. After receiving upki, the GM
randomly selects ri ∈ Z
∗
q and computes Ri = g
ri ,
h1 = H1(IDi||Xi||Ri||RN) and ki = ri + sh1 +
H2(X
s
i ). Here RN is the number of user revo-
cation. In general, the GM sets the initial value
of RN to 0 and publishes it to the CSP and
group users. Then the GM sends pski = ki and
ppki = Ri to the user ui through public channels.
• FullUserKeyGen. After receiving pski and
ppki, the user ui firstly computes di = ki−H2(P
xi)
and h1 = H1(IDi||Xi||Ri||RN). then checks
whether the equation gdi = Ri · P
h1 holds or not.
The user ui accepts pski and ppki if and only if
the above equation holds. Otherwise, it refuses
them and applies new pski and ppki again. Then
the user ui computes Di = H3(IDi)
di . Finally the
user ui sets ski = (xi, Di), pki = (Xi, Ri).
• TagGen. The user ui computes data-block
tags of file M , where M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}.
Firstly the user ui computes file identity FID =




xi , 1 6 j 6 n. Let σ = {σj}16j6n.
The GM keeps a public log file and saves H3(IDi),
pki, h1, n and FID in the public log file. Finally,
the user ui uploads (M,σ) to the CSP.
• Upload. After receiving the messages from the
user ui, the CSP first calculates FID = H4(M)
and h1 = H1(IDi ||Xi||Ri||RN). Then it verifies
the validity of tags and legitimacy of user iden-




or not. The CSP considers that these tags are valid
when the equation holds. Otherwise, it considers
that these tags are generated by an illegal user or
a revoked user.
• Challenge. The TPA first retrieves the pub-
lic log file to gain H3(IDi), pki, h1, n and FID.
Then it selects a c-element subset J , where J ⊆
[1, n], and k1 ∈ Z
∗
q as the seed for the pseudo-
random function f . Then it sends challenge mes-
sage chal = {c, k1} to the CSP.
• ProofGen. The CSP computes vj = f(k1, j)







j . Then it sets proof = (λ, T ) as
the proof and returns it to the TPA.
• Verify. The TPA calculates vj = f(k1, j)
for each j ∈ J receipt of the proof informa-
tion from the CSP. Then proof can be veri-
fied as below: ê(T, g) = ê(H3(IDi)






• RevTagUpdate. ur is defined as a revoked
user and uk is defined as a non-revoked user, where
1 6 r, k 6 n, k 6= r. We suppose that there is no
collusion among ur, uk and the CSP. Firstly, the
CSP randomly selects ρ ∈ Z∗q , computes Prev = g
ρ
and γrev = ρ + H2(X
ρ
k ) and sends (Prev, γrev) to
uk. When receiving (Prev , γrev), uk calculates














and sends (R1, R2) to the CSP. When receiving
(R1, R2), the CSP queries all the data-block tags
(mj′ , σj′ ) generated by user ur and updates these









• UpdateKey. Firstly, the RN increases by one.
According to the new RN , the GM runs Par-
tialKeyGen algorithm to generate a new partial
key for each non-revoked user. Finally, non-
revoked users regenerate their full public-private
keys by running FullUserKeyGen algorithm based
on the new partial keys.
Security analysis. Our scheme takes advantage
of the idea of key generation in certificateless sig-
natures [2]. Three types of adversaries are taken
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Figure 1 (Color online) (a) Computation cost and (b) communication cost.
into account [5], denoted as AI, AII, AIII, respec-
tively. They have different capabilities. A public
key replacement attack can be performed by AI
even without accessing the master key. AII can
not mount public key replacement attacks but can
get the master secret key. AIII cheats the veri-
fier by forging data integrity proof. For the three
adversaries mentioned above, the security of our
scheme is described as follows. For AI and AII,
the proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable
against chosen-message attacks under the CDH as-
sumption. AIII has an advantage ε to forge data
integrity proof under DL, where ε is negligible.
Suppose that a file is separated into n blocks,
where m blocks are tampered with. The proba-
bility of tampered data block being detected is at
least 1− (n−m
n
)c, where c is the number of blocks
challenged.
Performance analysis. By contrasting our
scheme with Li et al’s scheme [5] and Shen et
al’s scheme [1], we analyze the performance of our
scheme. Our experiment was carried out under the
Windows platform and used a Java programming
language with Java Pairing Based Cryptography.
So as to facilitate comparison, we adopt the same
parameters as scheme [1], that is, |q| and |p| is set
to 160 and 512 bits respectively.
The efficiency of public auditing can be shown
in Figure 1 (a). 460 blocks should be challenged
for 1,000,000 blocks to achieve the detection rate
of 99%. In the case, when the number of blocks
being challenged grows from 200 to 1000, the time
it takes to audit data integrity with our scheme
is from 5.4727 to 27.1671 s. In our scheme, the
computation cost during the auditing phase grows
linearly as the number of blocks to be challenged
increases. And our scheme takes less time than
schemes [5] and [1].
In the process of public integrity checking, the
communication cost is shown in Figure 1 (b). The
size of a block index is set to 160 bits. The commu-
nication overhead does not change with the num-
ber of blocks to be challenged in our scheme and
scheme [5]. In scheme [1] the communication cost
grows as the number of blocks to be challenged
increases. Obviously, our scheme is more effective
than schemes [5] and [1].
Conclusion. In this study, we come up with a
revocable certificateless public auditing for cloud
storage, which supports the key update of the
group user and the tag update of the revoked user.
The idea of the key exchange is introduced to gen-
erate the partial key of the group user. Besides,
we solve the problem of tag forgery in Li et al.’s
scheme and enhance the robustness of the system.
Security analysis and efficiency analysis indicate
that our scheme is secure and efficient.
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